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ABSTRACT 
This article explores ideas from Richard Rorty and Nancy Fraser on the justification of 
democracy. It considers both as exemplary of what, following Michael Walzer, we can call 
philosophizing “in the city” – eschewing any aim to adopt a generalised, metaphysical 
perspective on questions of social justice, and seeking instead to locate these, in their 
conception and elaboration, in the thick of lived social practice. For such approaches, as for 
other treatments of democracy, issues around inclusion will be key: whose voices should 
count in the democratic conversation, and how? I address Rorty’s claim that democracy is 
“prior” to philosophy, rather than requiring philosophical backup, and Fraser’s notion of 
“participatory parity”. Endorsing Kevin Olson’s diagnosis in the latter of a “paradox of 
enablement”, I consider the inclusion of the disabled as a way of addressing how this 
paradox might work in practice. I conclude in section 4 by suggesting that escaping the 
paradox seems to require venturing to a vantage point further from the city than either 
Rorty or Fraser would prefer. I suggest that a capabilities-based approach would be one 
way of doing this – but that this, indeed, involves deeper “traditional”-style philosophical 
commitments than pragmatists will be happy to support.  
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
At the opening of Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer contrasts two 
methodological vantage-points, two directions in which social philosophers 
might direct their gaze: “One way to begin the philosophical enterprise – 
perhaps the original way – is to walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the 
mountain, fashion for oneself (what can never be fashioned for ordinary men 
and women) an objective and universal standpoint. Then one describes the 
terrain of everyday life from far away so that it loses its particular contours 
and takes on a general shape. But I mean to stand in the cave, in the city, on 
the ground.” (Walzer 1983, p. xiv) 
If these are indeed the available options, then pragmatists of course will 
take the second route, and follow Walzer into the city. The critique of 
abstraction, the focus on practice and the general project of starting out from 
“here” and “us” rather than some supposed Archimedean point, from the 
contingent rather than the absolute or ahistorical – all of these features of 
pragmatism mark it out, in Walzer’s terms, as a “ground-level” method. And 
this is symptomatic both of its appeal, and the nervousness with which 
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philosophers will often respond to it. In some respects that nervousness is 
entirely justified, at least for those keen on preserving loftier versions of the 
philosopher’s role. If taken on board wholesale, the pragmatist sensibility 
shakes up the kind of thing that philosophy is, and makes trouble for many of 
its grander self-images as a privileged, masterly sphere of inquiry (see Calder 
2003). Yet the idea that philosophy might start in the city is not, in some deep 
way, at odds with the whole idea of thinking about justice, or truth, or 
freedom. After all, such notions are there in the city – being invoked, doing 
work, graspable – just as they are in more elevated, distanced places. A 
question posed by Walzer’s contrast is whether, standing in the city, one can 
operate solely within its walls. Can theory do its business without ever needing 
to “step outside” and retreat somewhere higher, to apprehend the “general 
shape” of things? Can one see enough, at ground level, to construct a robust, 
duly critical political stance?  
One kind of objection to thinking solely “within the city” echoes a familiar 
complaint about pragmatism, arising in response both to the work of its first-
generation proponents (Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead) and its late 20th century 
rearticulation by figures such as Richard Rorty. The complaint goes 
something like this. The combination of a prioritisation of (already existing) 
practice and the deflation of the critical pretentions of philosophy means that 
pragmatism “parochializes” critique and installs an unwarranted bias in 
favour of the social status quo. It forecloses inquiry by making in-place 
conventional belief the ultimate arbiter of any claim. Thus when James writes 
that “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and 
verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.” (James 1995, p. 77), he is staking 
out a position which is intrinsically conservative, and immunises the status 
quo against radical challenge. This is because any such challenge will be either 
dismissed as non-assimilable, or duly assimilated, absorbed and so neutralised 
into the mainstream. The result is a kind of default lack of dynamism, a lack of 
room for dialectical movement. As the Frankfurt School critical theorist Max 
Horkheimer puts it, “if the idea of a dangerous, explosive truth cannot come 
into the field of vision, then the present social structure is consecrated” 
(Horkheimer 1993, p. 196). The opposition between first-generation 
pragmatists and their counterparts in the Frankfurt critical theory tradition 
thus centres on the question of whether there is reality, or objectivity, beyond 
the intersubjective affimation of what is functionally useful in light of current 
dominant priorities. To the critical theorists, the pragmatists were guilty of 
“identity thinking”, to use Adorno’s phrase: of conflating the object with our 
consciousness of it (see Adorno 1973; Calder 2007, ch. 1). In Walzer’s terms, 
pragmatists seem to be mistaking the current horizons of what passes for 
wisdom in the city as the very limit of reality itself.  
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This article is about the implications of all of this for pragmatist accounts 
of democracy. My suggestion will be that whatever the appeal of city over 
mountain, we will always end up needing to move between the two. Thus for 
all the richness of Walzer’s image, the dichotomy it suggests is a false one. This 
is not a generalised claim about the very nature and scope of philosophy. 
Rather, it is a reflection based on an exploration of two recent treatments of 
democracy by thinkers attempting, in their different idioms, to operate at 
ground-level, and free from loftier, shakier metaphysical commitments. Those 
thinkers are Rorty and Nancy Fraser. They are not considered theoretical 
bedfellows, by fans of their work or indeed by themselves. Fraser has made 
probing, illuminating criticisms of perceived tensions within Rorty’s 
pragmatism (Fraser 1989) and of the mainstream of the tradition more 
generally (Fraser 1998). Meanwhile Rorty himself finds Fraser’s work too 
theoretical, too much lured by the mountain, as it were (if not its summit, at 
least its lower slopes) to operate within an adequately post-metaphysical mode 
of political theorising – see Rorty (2008), especially pp. 77-8. Yet as I will 
argue, their positions are perhaps not as different – and their starting-points 
less distant – than these exchanges suggest. In fact, whatever her take on the 
specifics Rorty’s own theoretical preferences, there is nothing in Fraser’s 
recent work which is radically incompatible with a pragmatist orientation. It 
gives, as I shall argue, a strong, appealing account of what a pragmatist 
approach to certain political questions might look like. But it is not, as I shall 
also argue, thereby problem-free. 
Section 1 looks at the role of inclusion and participation in democratic 
theory, accentuating their centrality for “city-level” theorists – and explores 
alongside this Rorty’s notorious claim that democracy itself is “prior” to 
philosophy. Section 2 looks at Fraser’s work, and in particular the extent to 
which it is compromised by what Kevin Olson has identified as a “paradox of 
enablement”. Put briefly, this paradox reflects the difficulty in including non-
oppressively in the participatory process those in the weakest position to 
include themselves. In Section 3, I consider the example of disability as a way 
of addressing how this paradox, or something like it, might work in practice. I 
conclude in section 4 by suggesting that escaping the paradox seems to require 
venturing to a vantage point further from the city and up the mountain than 
either Rorty or Fraser would prefer. I suggest that a capabilities-based 
approach would be one way of doing this – but that this, indeed, involves 
deeper “traditional”-style philosophical commitments than pragmatists will be 
happy to endorse. Thus again: whatever the appeal of city-based philosophy – 
and pragmatism’s take on this is always going to be amongst the very richest – 
we find, at least in exploring questions around participation and democracy, 
that we need to move between city and mountain more than pragmatists 
themselves will be ready to admit.  
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1. The priority of inclusion to philosophy? 
 
In James Bohman’s recent phrasing, “Democracy is that set of institutions 
and procedures by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens 
to form and change the terms of their common life together, including 
democracy itself” (Bohman 2007, p. 45). On this as on other definitions (of 
which there are of course many, but even so), questions of inclusion and 
equality are key to a working-through of what amounts to democratic practice. 
Thus, for Iris Young, “The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision 
depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the 
decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the 
outcomes”– and included on equal terms (Young 2000, pp. 5-6, cf. P. 53). 
Democratic theory has become increasingly sensitive to issues surrounding the 
dynamics of all this, and less presumptive and generalised about the place and 
orientation of the political subject in the arena of democratic engagement. 
Especially in the wake of the “deliberative turn” – with its focus on “the 
ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic 
deliberation about that decision” (Dryzek 2000, p. v) – we find nuanced 
attention to the ways in which differences in individuals’ situations (along 
lines of gender, class, culture and otherwise) shape the kinds of participatory 
exchange and representation of different voices which democratic theorists 
savour. And much recent energy has been directed, specifically, towards 
enhancing the access of previously excluded voices to the democratic 
“conversation” (see e.g. Connolly 1991; Phillips, 1995; Young 2000; Calder 
2006).  
But inclusion of whom, and equality of what? What are the conditions of 
(genuine) participation in decision-making processes? And should we treat 
these as specific, philosophical questions to be resolved from a mountaintop 
vantage point before we venture down into the city to see how its attempts at 
democracy measure up?  
For Rorty, the answer to that last question is no. In a piece originally 
written in 1984, and marking the beginning of the stage in which his work 
came to be taken seriously by “mainstream” political philosophers in the 
Anglo-American mode, Rorty seeks to disentangle philosophical questions – 
about rationality, the human subject, truth, the ultimate moral order – from 
the kinds of reasons which might commend liberal democratic institutions over 
their alternatives. While democracy “may need philosophical articulation,” he 
insists, “it does not need philosophical backup”: “On this view, the philosopher 
of liberal democracy may wish to develop a theory of the human self which 
comports with the institutions that he or she admires. But such a philosopher 
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is not thereby justifying these institutions by reference to more fundamental 
premises, but the reverse: He or she is putting politics first and tailoring a 
philosophy to suit.” (Rorty 1991, p. 178) 
For Rorty this is just the way it goes – and is not something to get hung up 
about. To be sure, philosophy can furnish us with enlightening, progressive, 
efficacious ways of describing what a good society, and good citizens, would be 
like. Terms such as “rights” provide very useful ways in which to describe 
what seems most important. But we can use such terms without getting 
bogged down in metaphysical details. We can, in a resonantly Rortian phrase, 
“enjoy the benefits of metaphysics without assuming the appropriate 
responsibilities.” If we do, we will need non-philosophical resources on which 
to stake our distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable, right and 
wrong, reasonableness and unreasonableness in the behaviour of fellow citizens 
and others: “[W]e shall still need something to distinguish the sort of 
individual conscience we respect from the sort we condemn as ‘fanatical’. This 
can only be something relatively local and ethnocentric – the tradition of a 
particular community, the consensus of a particular culture. According to this 
view, what counts as rational or as fanatical is relative to the group to which 
we think it necessary to justify ourselves – to the body of shared belief that 
determines the reference of the word ‘we’. [...] For pragmatist social theory, 
the question of whether justifiability to the community with which we identify 
entails truth is simply irrelevant.” (Rorty 1991, p. 176) 
Hence the priority of democracy – of defending and developing the political 
institutions and practices which contemporary liberals hold dear – to any 
foundations which philosophy might offer in its support. 
There are various available lines of argument through which this case 
might be disputed. Here are three possibilities, none of which either entails nor 
is necessarily at odds with the others: 
1. That actually, devising democratic institutions and procedures does require prior 
philosophy. Thus we simply will not be able to consider what makes for “good” 
institutions and procedures without already considering foundational, 
philosophical questions about what people are generally like (i.e., about the 
human subject) and how this relates to normative priorities such as freedom 
and equality – which themselves, need philosophical underpinning if they’re to 
be viable as concepts. Thus if democracy works at the institutional level, this 
will be because it rests on some kind of philosophically coherent basis – and so 
we just do need to think about the latter first.  
2. That any defence of democracy will in any case end up leaning on philosophy. 
Here the claim is a deeper one: that there is an inevitability about making 
philosophical commitments inherent in the very nature of discussing 
democracy and its associated values. We cannot, then, justify democracy 
without getting our hands dirty, philosophically speaking. Metaphysical 
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questions are adhesive; we cannot escape their stickiness simply by preferring 
not to address them.  
3. That once up and running, the practice of democracy will rely on philosophical 
input/ understandings in order to work. From this angle, the practice of 
democracy, to remain fair, just, and (as it were) true to itself, will require 
philosophical maintenance. It needs the kind of ad hoc reflection on deep 
theoretical questions – such as the nature of freedom and equality – which 
Rorty would lump in with metaphysics, but is part and parcel of doing justice 
to what purportedly makes democracy valuable in the first place.    
All three lines are arguable at the “spectator” level, from a position some 
way up the mountain. Yet back in the city, it is not clear how they relate to 
the perspectives of citizens themselves. Do they care, in the end, whether there 
is some kind of ultimate philosophical corroboration either of the political 
system they operate under, or their own moral stances on this or that issue? 
Does the philosophical negotiation of such questions make any difference 
whatsoever to the “real-life” orientations of participants in democratic 
processes? At first blush at least, it seems entirely plausible to offer “no” as an 
answer to both of these questions. If this is a sustainable position, then we find 
that the lived experience of democracy in the city gives it enough of a 
grounding, without the need for any mountaintop perspective.  
The appeal of pragmatism, then, lies partly in the offer of a focus on the 
practicalities of inclusion rather than theoretical nuance. If inclusivity and 
participation are so valuable, perhaps we should look at what they are like 
when they work well, and go with that flow, rather than formalising a 
theoretical model designed as a framework for practice, but which actual 
people may not recognise the validity of, or feel bound by. For Rortians, 
practice unites while theoretical debates divide: the former will be presented as 
providing the kind of social glue which the latter will always deny us. 
Theoretical power (“the force of the better argument”, in Habermas’s phrase – 
see 1990, pp. 158-9) does not motivate us into commitment to democracy like 
the practicalities of involvement in concrete social practices do (Rorty 2007). 
Inclusion – both in the sense of the individual’s orientation towards the polity 
in which they live, and in terms of the reach of that polity’s active 
membership – does not rely on theoretical underpinnings, either in its 
conception or is maintenance. As Rorty memorably says in Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity, the process of “coming to see other human beings as ‘one of us’ 
rather than ‘one of them’” is enabled not by theory, but by the redescriptive 
sources provided by “genres such as ethnography, the journalists’s report, the 
comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, the novel” (Rorty 1989, p. xvi). 
This is indeed a neatly fitting corollary of the severing of democracy from any 
necessary reliance on philosophy.  
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As will be seen, though, I am not sure that this account of things works – 
when we consider democracy in practice – in the ways Rorty would envisage. 
Later in this article, I will defend claims 2 and 3 above, and seek to show why 
in the end, they pose practical (and not just theoretical) problems for 
pragmatism.  
 
2. Fraser and the paradox of enablement 
 
Nancy Fraser’s work is often presented as being at the other end of the same 
lineage of critical theory which begins with Horkheimer and Adorno. In 
practice she is an adept inter-weaver of themes from this tradition with other 
resources, notably feminist and post-structuralist thinking. For my purposes 
here, I am primarily interested in what she has said about democracy and 
inclusion – and in how this relates to Rorty’s “take” on the relationship 
between democracy and philosophy. Of particular relevance is the priority she 
places, in sketching out a distinctive conception of social justice, on 
“participatory parity” – a way of spelling out the place of democratic inclusion 
in that wider scheme. 
For Fraser, “justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) 
members of society to interact with one another as peers” (2003, p. 36). Parity 
means “the condition of being a peer, of being on a par with others, of standing 
on an equal footing” (2003, p.101 n. 39). The moral requirement is that 
“members of society be offered the possibility of parity, if and when they 
choose to participate in a given activity or interaction” (Ibid.). Fraser 
identifies two key impediments to participatory parity conceived on these lines 
(Fraser 2003; cf Fraser 1997). First: economic inequality, stemming from 
maldistribution of resources. And second: cultural misrecognition, stemming 
from a lack of regard for one’s particularity. Where other proponents of the 
crucial place of recognition in conceptions of social justice – most saliently Iris 
Young (1997) and Axel Honneth (2003) – treat recognition as the fundamental 
moral category, with distribution as derivative, Fraser recommends a 
“perspectival dualism” which “casts the two categories as co-fundamental and 
mutually irreducible dimensions of justice” (Fraser 2003, p. 3).  
Now it is important in our current context to stress that Fraser herself 
presents participatory parity as an instance of “democratic pragmatism”. On 
the one hand, it is a universalist norm: it encompasses all adult partners to 
interaction, and it presupposes the equal moral worth of human beings (Fraser 
2003, p. 45). But recognition itself in these terms is not wedded to some prior 
commitment to this or that philosophical conception of the human subject. It 
is “a remedy for social injustice, not the satisfaction of a generic human need” 
(Ibid.). As Fraser goes on to put it: “For the pragmatist, [...] everything 
depends on precisely what currently misrecognized people need in order to be 
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able to participate as peers in social life. In some cases, they may need to be 
unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness. In other cases, 
they may need to have hirtherto unacknowledged distinctiveness taken into 
account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or 
disadvantaged groups, outing the latter’s distinctiveness, which has been 
falsely parading as universal. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct the 
very terms in which attributed differences are currently elaborated. Finally, 
they may need all of the above, or several of the above, in combination with 
one another and in combination with redistribution. Which people need which 
kind(s) of recognition in which contexts depends on the nature of the obstacles 
they face with regard to participatory parity.” (Fraser 2003, p. 47) 
And as she adds, this “cannot be determined by an abstract philosophical 
argument”, but only, instead, with a “critical social theory... that is 
normatively oriented, empirically informed, and guided by the practical intent 
of overcoming injustice” (Ibid.). 
I cite all this at length to highlight the importance of two aspects of 
Fraser’s case for participatory parity. Firstly: it is presented as a norm 
generated within the city, rather than up the mountain. It needs, in Rorty’s 
terms, no “philosophical backup”. Secondly, and on the other hand, it has a 
complex, shifting, multi-dimensional texture. What it takes to ensure parity 
will vary significantly, as she says, from case to case. To justify their claims, 
she says, “recognition claimants must show in public processes of democratic 
deliberation that institutionalized patterns of cultural value unjustly deny 
them the intersubjective conditions of participatory parity and that replacing 
those patterns with alternative ones would represent a step in the direction of 
parity” (Ibid.). What the norms of participation actually amount to will be 
deliberatively elaborated; this is how their substance emerges. This last point 
also highlights, however, a specific kind of circularity problem with Fraser’s 
account. 
The problem is partially acknowledged by Fraser, but especially well 
captured by Kevin Olson, who puts it like this: participatory parity 
“presupposes equal agency at the same time that it seeks to promote it” (Olson 
2008, p. 261). Participation is the means by which claims to justice will be 
raised, and thus itself a kind of enabler of parity: it affords citizens not 
currently treated as peers the scope to argue for context-sensitive policies 
which will (as Fraser puts it above) “represent a step in the direction of 
parity”. But here an irony emerges. Olson sets it out like this: “The people who 
most need to make claims about injustice, those who are politically 
disadvantaged in a given society, are the ones whose participatory parity is 
most at risk. They are most in need of parity-promoting policies. By definition, 
though, people who cannot participate as peers are precisely the ones least 
capable of making such claims. The problem, in short, is that deliberation 
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presupposes participatory parity at the same time that deliberation is 
supposed to set the standards for participatory parity.” (Olson 2003, pp. 26-
61) 
Olson calls this circularity “the paradox of enablement”. This occurs when 
“equally able citizens are both presupposed by deliberation and are its intended 
product” (Ibid.). (The paradox is a version of a wider, long-standing circularity 
problem about democratic legitimacy: for democratic institutions to be the 
result of the people’s will, they must pre-exist themselves, to enable that will 
to be registered in the first place. Or to put it the other way around, the 
people, to institute democracy, must be somehow prior to itself. On this point, 
see Gaon (2010).)  
We can sum up the paradox of enablement like this: standards concerning 
what it is to participate, to be a peer, are themselves something to be produced 
through the participatory process. For participatory parity to be participatory, 
such norms cannot pre-date the process, but are engendered by it. They are 
thrown up by deliberations among the citizenry, not delivered pre-packaged 
from the mountain top. But for participatory parity to obtain at the point of 
deliberation, we must “presuppose equal agency in the processes through 
which it is formulated”. Inclusion, as it were, needs to be prior to itself for the 
process to work in the way Fraser expects of it. As Olson rightly points out, 
what we find here is an epistemological problem concerning the voices of the 
marginalised – which will not be heard, simply because they are not already 
equipped to participate on an equal footing. And such problems are starkest 
when they serve to prevent people from making claims about their own 
exclusion. Here “marginalization is not simply a violation of parity. It 
additionally deprives people of the means to demand inclusion” (Olson 2008, p. 
262). 
The norm of participatory parity is non-philosophical, in Rorty’s sense, in 
so far as it is generated not from some purportedly elevated theoretical 
vantage point but from within participatory processes themselves, i.e. through 
practice. To this extent, it seems authentically pragmatist. But it is also 
paradoxical. The claims of those not already equal may seem, within this 
model, like James’s “false ideas”: non-assimilable, and thereby exempt from 
contributing to the deliberative process. One can anticipate the voice of 
Horkheimer here: certain kinds of “dangerous” claim seem to be placed beyond 
the epistemic radar. What, if we are to sustain the ideal of inclusion, is to be 
done? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatism, critical theory and democratic inclusion 
 
 61
3. Disability, capability and the norms of participation 
 
The normative power of the notion of participatory parity lies in its 
orientation to include on an equal footing those who might otherwise be 
marginalised. There are of course a wide array of reasons for such exclusion, 
many arising from deep-laid aspects of social structure, and patterns of 
oppression. To work through the implications of the paradox of enablement, it 
is worth taking a specific example – something which Olson, perhaps 
ironically, does not in fact do, even as he meticulously rehearses different 
aspects of the paradox. Let us consider one category among those not fitting 
the classical (political philosophical) mould of the independent, self-sufficient 
agent: the disabled. Despite the general foregrounding of issues around 
inclusion, disability still tends not to feature in the mainstream of normative 
political theory – and neither recognition theory nor democracy theory, 
perhaps oddly, offer any exception in this respect (see, on this, Calder 2010). 
This is odd, as disability can in such obvious ways hook up with disadvantage 
in from the perspective both of economics (maldistribution) and culture 
(misrecognition). People with disabilities are among the most likely in society 
to be economically vulnerable, and not to be recognised as being on an equal 
footing. They thus provide a prime example of those whose participatory 
parity is most at risk.  
Accounts of the politics of disability in the contemporary west are often 
rendered in terms of the story of the social model. The social model of 
disability emerges in the work of theorists attached to the disability rights 
movement. Its origins are usually traced to a declaration by the Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976. This marked out 
physical disability as a form of social oppression, centred particularly in 
exclusion from the employment market (UPIAS 1976, p. 14). The social model 
is conventionally contrasted with the more individualized “medical model” 
taken to be historically dominant in institutional practice. In the latter, bodily 
impairment is presented as the initial cause in a causal chain which may issue 
in functional disadvantage. Thus the biomedical condition (such as visual 
impairment) was conceived as a kind of given – a “personal tragedy” the 
effects of which it is the job of expert professionals to mitigate (Morris 1991, p. 
180). For proponents of the social model, its dominant, individualized 
counterpart is itself disempowering. By focusing attention on the individual 
condition and the limitations it imposes, it distracts from the ways in which 
social factors – “environments, barriers and cultures” (Oliver 2009, p. 45) – 
disable. It thus neglects the extent to which disability might be addressed not 
by searching for elusive “cures” for physical impairments, or helping 
individuals adapt to their own particular burden, but instead through reform 
of those social factors which would allow for the de-victimization of the 
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disabled and a positive affirmation of difference in place of the presumption 
that impairments themselves impose an inherent disadvantage. Thus for 
UPIAS, impairment is physiological but disability is “the disadvantage of 
restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization which 
takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus 
excludes them from the mainstream of social activities” (UPIAS 1976, p. 14). 
The social model is a powerful tool, and a controversial one. On the one 
hand it has been subject to a good deal of debate among proponents of 
disability rights, along both philosophical and political lines – see, inter alia, 
Barnes and Mercer (2010), Cole (2007), Oliver (1990, 2009) Shakespeare (2006), 
Smith (2005), Swain et al (2003), Terzi (2004). On the other hand it has (and 
this is the cause for some ambivalence in the disability rights movement) been 
adopted with remarkable speed into institutional frameworks and indeed 
government legislation. Thus in the contemporary UK, versions of the social 
model find official articulation both in the “diversity policies” of public 
institutions, and in successive pieces of equality legislation – most recently, the 
Equality Act 2010. The presumptive focus is shifted from individuals bearing 
impairments to institutions which might themselves disable, and which are 
given a responsibility proactively to minimise the ways in which they might. 
All of this is significant, in our current context, precisely because of the aim at 
stake: a form, in Fraser’s terms, of participatory parity. In particular, 
internally diverse ways, disabled people have historically been on the end of a 
kind of pincer movement between Fraser’s two key impediments to parity: 
maldistribution and misrecognition. The social model itself emerges from 
political practice, and is pragmatic in orientation: it is a strategy for barrier-
removal, for reform of environments and attitudes.   
It is also a prime case study with regard to the paradox of enablement, in 
the way that Olson frames this. Thus, again: for participatory parity to obtain 
at the point of deliberation, we must “presuppose equal agency in the 
processes through which it is formulated”. Now for its proponents, of course, 
the whole point of the social model is that such parity has not obtained with 
regard to the disabled. Thus if there has been an adjustment of the terms of 
participation – of the conditions for inclusion, and the presumptions about 
equality and agency inherent in all of this – then this has happened despite a 
lack of prior parity. One might draw a sporting analogy. Say we are involved 
in a game running according to given rules of participation, which themselves 
are partial and presumptive as regards the scope for the physically impaired to 
be included. The social model emerges as a theoretical challenge to these 
presumptions, and to the existing norms of the game. It challenges their 
purported neutrality, and seeks to show that they are exclusionary in an 
arbitrary, unfair way which runs against both the spirit of the game and wider 
normative considerations. The articulation of the social model thus seems to 
 
Pragmatism, critical theory and democratic inclusion 
 
 63
demand a re-think in the name of equality of opportunity, involving starting 
the game afresh according to adapted rules. But to instigate this on Fraser’s 
terms, the disabled would-be participant needs recourse to prior or overarching 
rules which trump the given history of participatory exchange thus far. It is 
not clear where these can come from. If the terms of participatory parity must 
themselves emerge from the deliberations of the already included, it is not 
clear how the voice of those excluded enter into the picture, except at the 
behest of those already “in on the conversation”. It relies on their capacity for 
imagination, their goodwill, their sense of inclusivity, and other contingencies 
– but it cannot be guaranteed by the prior framing of rules which, precisely, 
have not taken into account the proposition posed by this alternative model. If 
the social model is to be successful in transforming the rules of the game, it 
needs to find a way of speaking from outside those rules, in such a way that 
existing participants are persuaded of the need to expand their parameters, 
and to include those who hitherto have been least able to participate within 
them. The social model here presents a “dangerous” claim, in Horkheimer’s 
sense. The concern about Fraser’s model is that, echoing those initial qualms 
about first-generation pragmatism, it insulates itself against such claims even 
while its spirit suggests that it should be geared towards their inclusion. 
So we have, here, an example of how the paradox of enablement might 
work in practice. What is striking about this example is that in political 
reality, the social model has in many ways been a successful intervention. Of 
course, political reality is by no means characterised by the kinds of prior 
guarantees of participatory parity which Fraser favours in her ideal model. 
The social model has imposed itself despite a range of vested interests, 
structural inequalities and operations of power which have in important ways 
been pitted against it. Why might this have happened? Clearly, it has 
presented a forceful case. It seems, though, that acceptance of the force of the 
case means getting outside of the game as it is running, outside the city limits, 
and considering things from an angle beyond current terms of participation. In 
Walzer’s terms, it means going at least part of the way up the mountain. And 
in terms of Rorty’s case for the priority of democracy to philosophy, this 
points, I think, to the strength of two of the possible lines of argument against 
that claim – numbers 2 and 3, as given above.  
Taking Fraser’s model of participatory parity as exemplary of a 
particularly refined, elegant and appealing version of what democracy might 
amount to: can it operate without philosophical backup? I would suggest not. 
To defend it, to work through its implications, to ensure that it does not 
involve some kind of pre-emptive exclusion of marginalised voices, or effect 
such exclusions in practice – all of this requires that we lean on philosophy in a 
broad sense. We cannot justify it without getting our hands dirty in this way – 
for example, by considering what exactly counts as disability. The social model 
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raises metaphysical questions, as part of its political project. It is a persuasive 
philosophical case. If it is right, it changes the terms of existing debates on 
inclusion. It does this in part by virtue of its philosophical power, and the 
subtlety of its take on questions of structure and agency, physiology and 
subjectivity, cause and effect, freedom and determinism, the nature of respect, 
and so forth. If taking the social model seriously is a requirement for 
purportedly “inclusive” paradigms of democratic engagement, then we need to 
acknowledge that the relationship between philosophy and democracy is not as 
incidental, or characterised by the kind of mutual independence, that Rorty 
suggests. Now it may of course be that the rhetorical influence of the social 
model is best achieved if it is presented not in the idiom of theory, but of the 
“docu-drama or the comic book”. But the point is that its coherence, its 
relation to the purported norms of a polity, its deeper case for a revision of our 
understanding of the relation between individuals and their environments – all 
of these are factors the outworking of which requires exactly the kinds of 
philosophical analysis and dispute which Rorty deems extraneous, and 
something to be saved for weekends. The relation between theory and practice 
is not, as we confront practical political reality, as birfurcated as the very 
possibility of separating out democracy and philosophy would suggest.  
 
 
4. Capabilities and the boundaries of inclusion  
 
None of this is to question the appeal of Fraser’s notion of participatory 
parity, or indeed of the pragmatist priority of practice over theory. It is, 
though, to suggest that theory haunts the practical negotiation of politics in 
ways which are inconvenient to the kind of full-on demotion of philosophy to a 
kind of luxury side-show which Rorty’s picture of democracy offers. To put it 
more strongly: to prioritise practice is itself a theoretical commitment, and one 
which requires theoretical negotiation if it is not to generate problems for 
itself. The notion of inclusion is a particularly fertile example to use in this 
respect, precisely because its meaning is not self-evident enough, in some a 
priori way, for an inclusive politics to be achieved or sustained without 
recourse to the kinds of philosophical maintenance which, on an account such 
as Rorty’s, are supposed to be superfluous. Philosophy on a modest scale is 
something which we cannot escape our entanglement with as we negotiate the 
political playing out of any given model of democracy.   
As for the paradox of enablement, one implication it poses, I think, is that 
we need a degree of commitment to certain meta-principles in order to escape 
the more pernicious aspects of this particular kind of dead-end. Inclusion is not 
a value in itself, or regardless of the terms on which it takes place, or who is 
included, or what voices gain “airtime” in the process. It is a value in so far as 
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it promotes some kind of first-order good, or goods. If we consider the politics 
of the disability rights movement, we find a good example of why this is so. It 
is not that inclusion in the mainstream – in terms of employment, or social 
participation in other ways – is valued for its own sake by proponents of the 
social model. After all, the mainstream may not itself be such a great place. 
Being in the thick of the city can be liberating, but it can also be oppressive. 
Being on the inside isn’t always so great. Rather, inclusion is valued because it 
is presumed to offer goods conceived as having prior, non-contingent value. 
We might talk here of autonomy, of solidarity, of citizenship. For my part, I 
think the most helpful language here is that of capability, in the sense in which 
Amartya Sen uses the term (see Calder 2010). For Sen, “what matters to 
people is that they are able to achieve actual functionings, that is the actual 
living that people manage to achieve” (Sen 1999, p. 74). Crucial here is “the 
freedom to achieve actual livings that one can have a reason to value” (Ibid, p. 
73), and thus “the capabilities... to choose a life that one has reason to value” 
(p. 74 – my emphasis).  
I will not offer here some comprehensive case for considering capabilities as 
the best rubric for thinking about the kind of good which might lie prior to 
inclusion, give a reason for commending it, and provide a yardstick by which 
the playing-out of participation might be gauged in terms of its contribution 
to well-being. The basic suggestion is just that some such rubric is required in 
order to escape the clutches of the paradox of enablement, and also those 
surrounding the commendation of democracy more generally. It is not that 
participatory parity itself can be the source of the value of participatory 
parity, or that democracy itself explains the value of democracy. Rather, 
democracy will be valuable, if it is, because it delivers things which are 
conceived as valuable in a prior way. The case for extending the boundaries of 
inclusion is that it “does justice” in some sense, to some prior value. Now 
again, what that prior value is, is of course disputable. What pragmatism 
cannot do, in promoting the centrality of practice, is avoid getting tangled up 
in questions about what it is valuable about practice. If at this stage we insist 
that our negotiation of such questions can be done, as Rorty suggests, only in 
terms “relatively local and ethnocentric”, this traps us in the paradox of 
enablement. To put it another way, if enablement is what makes inclusion 
valuable, we need a prior account of what counts as enablement which takes 
priority to the value of inclusion itself, and to which the latter serves as a 
conduit. It may be, as the example of the social model suggests, that doing 
justice to our commitment to whatever it is that inclusion is supposed to 
deliver will require us to re-structure the environment in which democratic 
participation takes place.  
But such an approach will involve “philosophical” commitments disallowed 
by both Rorty and Fraser – the kind of generalised consideration of the 
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conditions of well-being, and thus of “the human subject”, which will require 
an excursion from the city, at least part-way up the mountain. There is a 
circularity about democracy from which only a recourse to “prior philosophy” 
seems to offer an escape.   
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